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ON LAUGHTER, COMICALITY,
HUMOUR
Liberato Santoro-Brienza I
As a purely physiological phenomenon, laughter seems to beadequately understood. However the full experience of
laughter-in its content, as it were, and its causes-appears to be less
simple. In the entry that goes under the tirle 'Rire', the Vocobulairede
theologie biblique asks the rhetorical question: "quoi de plus complcxe
que Ie rire?"l Along with the numerous encyclopaedic companions to
the Bible, the aforementioned Vocabulaire echoes the comments of
the Fathers of the Church, and most explicitly of Saint Hasil, who
noted "the ambiguity of the word laughter" in the Scriptures.)
Even more ambiguous, polysemic, and complex than laughter are
its content and causes: comicality and humour. The wealth of theories
and reflections that aim to clarifY their nature and structure bears
witness to their polysemic complexity. Most of these theories and
reflections refer to comicality and humour as if they were
interchangeable synonyms. One of the main intentions of this essay is
to attempt to differentiate between the two, while cursorily presenting
some preferred arguments and ideas about this vast subject.
Let us begin with the story of laughter. One of the earliest
documents dealing with the mysterious power of laughter is to be
found-so we are told-in a papyrus scroll which relates how:
a Gocihead of almost certain Ilelicnized Egyptian
eXI racrion ... laughs aloud seven times ... and thereby sets
creation 10 motion. Out of each laugh wonderfully leaps
one of the seven functional gods of the universe. \X!hen
the Godhead laughs fur the first time, light appears, and
the gud uf fire and the cosmos is horn. When the
Godhead laughs for the secono, the waters arc so amazed
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they separate, and the gon of the abyss makes his appear-
ance. Thereafter, as bitterness and sadness have their way
with him ... more fateful gods arc thrown up. Until at last,
with the emotions fairly balanced, he whistles mightily to
the earth which labours to bring forth a being of its own,
a dragon by the name of Phochophoboch, the shining
one, the cause, ultimately, of Phobos-terror. The primal
laugh docs not make the world an unmitigatedly hreezy
place. There arc tears in laughter."
This E!''Yptian story, redolent with Hellenic overtones, reminds us
that ancient Greek and Roman mythology resounded with the echo
of many laughters. We speak, for example, of 'Homeric laughter'.
Zeus-like most of the gods-laughed. Joviality derives from the
name of Jove. In the Homeric Hymn, baby Hermes "laughed with
endless delight" at the sight of the mountain tortoise, foreseeing the
sacrificial metamorphosis of the harmless creature into the lyre. And
then there is Demeter's laughter, provoked by the iambic comic
obscenities of, precisely, lambe.
According to some mythical narratives and traditions, lambc was
reputed to be the daughter of Echo and Pan: the child born of repetitive
Chattering and Lustfulness. Other traditions simply present her as
an old woman from Halimos. In any case, lambe's claim to distinction
remains the same: she made the sad Demeter laugh again. One
version of the story runs like this:
Demeter, godness of the sprouting corn, is inconsolable.
Hades has carrico off her beloveo ciaughter, Persephone.
He has entomhed her with him in the world helow,
leaving the earth wintry. Demeter wanders her kingciom.
veiled, rohed as an old woman, unrecognizahle,
ungodessIJke, searching in vain for her daughter. At length
she arrives in Eleusis, where she accepts neither food nor
drink. She sinks upon a rock named 'Unsmiling' ann
mourns ... Until lambe appears in her presence. And
pours from her mouth a stream of obscenities. Jests.
Ribaldry. Mockeries. Indecencies ... She becomes, in
other words, a comenian. Anci in the face of her comedy,
Demeter's despair evaporates. She rises from the rock
called Tnsmiling'. She laughs. She cats. She drinks. She
comes alive. The recumhent earth stirs again.5
The aforementioned mythical tales suggest, firstly, that laughter is
at the same time a liberating and creative life-force, and a destructive
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power containing elements of malice, fear and terror; and secondly,
that laughter was understood in ancient times as something quite
primordial. We could, then, rephrase Goethe's rephrasing of "in the
beginning was the word", and agree with our Egyptian ancestors that
"in the beginning was laughter". Hut this would not accord with
other mythical narratives. Laughter does not feature conspicuously
in the biblical texts, for instance.
In Umberto Eco's The Name ofthe Rose, the monk Jorge of Burgos
(who has his real twentieth-century counterpart in Anthony M.
Ludovici, arguably the most virulent contemporary foe of hilarity~),
abhorring the idea that an ancient text ascribed to an auctoritas such
as Aristotle could deal with laughter, has no qualms about poisoning
his community brothers. In his fanaticism, he argues-against textual
evidence to the contrary-that there is no mention of laughter in the
New Testament. He is, however, correct in repeating that Jesus is
never portrayed as laughing. Jorge's primary preoccupation seems to
concern the upholding of the Benedictine monastic rules. And, so,
he reminds his brothers: "lit'rba vana aut risui apta non loqur",.7
The already-quoted V()cabulaire de theologie biblique mentions
thirty-two references to laughter in the Uible. Apparently, there are
only two cases in the Old Testament that clearly associate laughter
with joy. Most of the other instances are expressions of scorn,
derision, contempt and mocking. It would appear that the writers of
the Bible had a diabolical sense of humour. As a result, a biblical joke
is no laughing matter. (That this should actually be the case will
become quite obvious when we will discuss the subversive character
of humour and comicality). But, then, precisely because the biblical
beginning -and in fact the whole text, in its not negligible length-
is so serious, Spike Milligan could successfully spice it up in his own
modernised version of the story of creation. Here is a short sample.
I. In the beginnmg God created the heaven and the earth.
2. And darkness was upon the face of the deep; this was
due to a malfunction at Lots Road Power Station.
). And God said, Let there be light: and there was light,
but Eastern Electricity Hoard said He would have to wait
until Thursday to he connected.
4. And God saw the light and it was good; He saw the
quarterly bill and that was not good ...
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10. And God salli. Let the seas bring forth that that hath
life, floodIng the market with fish fingers, fishburgcrs and
grade-three salmon.
I J. Anrl God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, muhiply,
and fill the sea, and let fowl multiply on earth where
Prince Charles and Prince Philip would shoot them...
/5. Anrl Gorl said, Behold, I have given you the first of
free yiclrling seed. to you this shall be meat, but to the EC
it will he a Beef Mountain.x
As a neuro-physiological phenomenon, laughter has been explained
as consisting in the involuntary contraction of fifteen facial muscles,
accompanied by certain irrepressible noises, suspended respiration,
sudden convulsive shaking of the shoulders and of the whole body.
Thus understood, "laughter is a reflex, but it is unique in that it has
no apparent biologIcal purpose. One might call It a luxury reflex. Its
only function seems to be to provide relief from tension".Y If the
neuro-physiology of the bodily act of laughter is clearly understood
and defined, its causes seem to resist attempts at definition-if for
no other reason than their endless variety-and have been explained
in a large number of mostly partial definitions. There are, of course,
instances of purely neuro-physiological causes of laughter. I think of
hysterical laughter, individual or collective, as a discharge of pent-up
tension. Young children arc known to hreak out in laughter at the
moment when a state of tense anxiety induced by fear is suddenly
removed. Youngsters are seen to come out of school laughing their
heads off, without any apparent reason. There is the unstoppable,
quite involuntary and embarrassingly contagious laughter that seizes
one in the most solemn occasions marked by prolonged tension and
restraint. And there is 'spastic laughter', along with other kinds,
caused by lesions and other damage to the braln. lfI
Perhaps precisely because of the difficulty of the subject, laughter
becomes more interesting when we consider it in the light of its causes:
as triggered by comicality and humour. Here we encounter that endless
variety of explanations and definitions that made some theorists, like
Victor Raskin despair ofever unravelling the elusive nature ofcomicality,
and of ever fuUy grasping the essence of humour. For instance,
Croce (/<)03, 228) claimed that "humour is undefinahlc
like all psychological states." Bergson (,8<)<), 61) warned:
"We shall nor aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within
a rlcfinition" ... "we regarrl it, ahove all, a living thing."
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One of the implications of this was, of course, that humor
will defy any definition ami escape from any prison.
Bergson, however, was one of those who did not give up
hope altogether: "The comic spirit has a logic of its own,
even in its wIldest forms. It has method in its madness"
(ibid, 62). ''The funniest thing about comedy is that you
never know why people laugh," admitted W.e. Fields.
"I know what makes them laugh, but trying to get your
hands on the why of it is like trying to pick an eel out of a
tuh of water. II
We might add that it is like looking, face to face, into the eyes of a
platypus, and trying to make sense of its baffling morphology. Raskin
notes another difficulty to be encountered when dealing with
advanced theories on comicality and humour: "Humor has defeated
researchers in still another, perhaps more subtle, less conspicuous
and ultimately more harmful way. It has generated a great number of
loose, incomplete, unrestricted or circular definitions of itself".I~
Among others-but arguably more cogently than others-
Pirandello, in his L'umorismo, pointed to the ambiguous, amphibian
and paradOXical nature of comicality and humour. Giv~n his anti-
rationalistic stance, Pirandello found the problem of umorismo
particularly fascinating. From his point of view, comicality-and its
variation, humour-has the distinctive virtue of having frustrated
and embarrassed all the philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, etc.
who have tried to define it. This has led some more recent theorists
to think of humour and comicality as purely hypothetical universal
concepts: Refle:r:ionshegriffe, in the Kantian sense, encompassing a vast
and diversified set of phenomena bearing a 'family resemblance', in
the Wittgensteinian sense.
Summing up Pirandello's analysis in part, we can make-along
with Eco-three initial points:
(I) Humour and comicality, in the widest possible sense of the
words, refer to and denote a rather complex, diversified, imprecise
experience or phenomenon. For this reason, they also connote a
variety of sub-classes: irony, satire, sarcasm, wit, agudeza, conceit,
laughter, smile-"And we arc not sure whether these constitute
separate kinds of experience or are rather variations of a unified
fundamental experience". Laughter may appear, at first sight, to be
the common denominator. However, we soon discover that many
comical-and even more humorous-instances are associated with
and induce crying: the tear in the smile. Paradoxically, a tragic
clement seems to lurk behind the scene of comedy and humour.
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(2) More than laughter, unease and embarrassment, for instance,
may be better candidates for the common denominators of the
various forms of humour and comicality.
(3) Finally, the theorists of humour give either a definition that
does not account for all the possible manifestations of comicality
(Bergson and Freud, in particular, are singled out) or a definition that
implies too much, even situations and experiences that go beyond
what we generally call comical or humorous.
Pirandello suggests that the comical experience is triggered when we
"perceive the contrary" (tlvvertimento del contrario). In this suggestion we
find an echo of the main classical theories of comedy. For Aristotle,
for instance, the comical effect is produced when, in a sequence of
foreseeable events, something happens that alters the habitual and
familiar order of things. Kant thought that we laugh when an
unexpected and absurd situation frustrates, subverts, and vanquishes
our familiar and habitual expectations. Schopenhauer stands berween
Kant and Pirandello, who was significantly influenced by his thought.
However, in order for us to laugh because of what we perceive to
be an error, or mistake, or tlaw-according to the order of our
familiar construction of the world-it is necessary that we remain at
a distance and not be involved in the mistake. The 'mistake', or flaw,
belongs to somebody else and we-who are not in error or in a state
of imperfection-indulge in the fecling of being superior. Indeed,
comicality makes us feci healthy and wholesome, especially if we fear
we may be otherwise. Comicality, in other words, protects us against
the 'reality principle', as Freud would put it. And the imaginary self-
assurance that makes us laugh at the misfortunes of others-inferior to
us, of course-is indeed diabolical. So, we are diabolically surprised:
we are surreptitiously or symbolically jolted out of our diabolical
condition of everydayness and fear of novelty, and we laugh.
Pirandello gives an example which we may elaborate on. Imagine
an elderly lady who, out for a walk, dresses like a teenager: with
miniskirt, high stiletto boots, a transparent and tight t-shirt, dozens
of rings on her ears and nose, heavy facial make-up, dark-coloured
short hair. We perceive that the old lady is the opposite of what a
respectable and decorous senior citizen should be and look like. This
situation confronts us with a breakdown of our familiar expectations.
We feel detached in our understanding-however intuitive and
pre-reflective-of the lady's mistake, her desire to escape the
irreversible cruelty of time, her pathetic narcissistic attempt at
feigning an irretrievable condition. And so, we laugh.
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According to Pirandello, the distant "perception of incongruiry"
which produces a comic effect and triggers malicious laughter can
turn into a "feeling of incongruiry" if we abandon our detached and
supercilious stance. We can, in other words, empathise with the old
lady. We can identify with her intentions and concerns, her fears and
desires. We can introject the foibles and naive machinations of the
old comical lady. By doing or experiencing this, we abandon our sense
of distance, because we realise that, after all, we might all eventually
behave in the same silly manner. We become tolerant. We no longer
partake of a comical scenario. We are transported into the land of
humour. Our initial laughter is replaced by a compassionate sense of
pity and understanding. Laughter is replaced by a smile, not without
a little sadness and a tear.
To return to the question of definitions of comicality and
humour, it has been noted that the prevailing, if not in fact exclusive,
approaches to questions concerning comicality have attempted to
define it ontologically: they aim to find a substantialist answer to
the ontological question: "what is comicality, in itself?"!) This
observation would prompt us to suspect that perhaps there is
nothing laughable, comical or humorous in itself or, if you prefer,
'in reality'. Only thinking-and hence speaking-makes it so. This
suggestion would be supported in particular by those approaches to
humour that (respectful of its etymological roots in the Hippocratic
'humours') define it as "a temperament; a state of mind, mood;
inclination; facetiousness, comicality; and faculty of perceiving
comicality; jocose imagination (less intellectual and more sympathetic
than wit)", as indicated in the O>..ford Dictionary. Or, as Harvey
Mindess puts it in other words: "a frame of mind, a manner of
perceiving and experiencing life. It [humour] is a kind of outlook, a
peculiar point of view, and one which has great therapeutic
power".IJ Pirandello's definitions as well-of, on the one hand,
comicality as avvertimento del contrario: detached, supercilious,
objectifying or pro-jective "perception of incongruity"; and, on the
other, of humour as sentimento del contrario: empathic, sympathetic,
introjected "feeling of incongruity" that could affect us-point in the
direction of subjective disposition.
It would appear that the objects. the contents or raw material of
humour, comicality and laughter are, in themselves, either serious or
neutral, natural, banal, everyday occurrences. Generally, it seems that
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while humour and comicality bring to light some substantial and
serious feature of our human condition, they nonetheless focus on, or
take as their material, very accidental human properties, behaviours,
and events. And this seems to be particularly the case with comicality.
more so than with humour, perhaps.
Furthermore, let us not fail to notice-with Eco--that the majority
of writers who have attempted a 'serious' explanation of humour and
comicality were not humorous writers, nor comedians. Aristophanes,
Moliere, Lucianus, Groucho Marx, Rabelais, and Woody Allen, for
instance, have not made-to my knowledge-any serious attempt to
analytically solve the riddle of humour and comicality. Instead, we have
been granted reflections on the subject by Aristotle, a rather earnest
thinker, who wrote on comedy as a conclusion to his Poetics and as a
final explanation of tragedy; by the intellectually ponderous and
austere Immanuel Kant (though we have reason to believe, from his
biographies, that he was endowed with a very good sense of humour);
by the even more earnest Hegel who, it must be said, was quite keen
on and readily inclined to irony and sarcasm; by a post-romantic,
'splenetic' (depressive?) poet, such as Baudelaire; by a relatively
cheerless, anguished, and existentially over-anxious Kierkegaard; by a
totally humourless psychologist such as Theodor Lipps; by Henri
Bergson, haunted by metaphysical preoccupations; and finally by
Freud, who mirthlessly showed the way to turn our "neurotic misery
into everyday unhappiness", and in the end focused his theoretical
efforts on the not so cheerful notion of our "death instinct".
To return to our main theme, it would appear that there is no
laughable, comical and humorous 'thing', an sich. If this is the case, we
are obliged to think that the power of humour and comicality-which,
as suggested, seems to lie on the side of subjective disposition-rests
mainly, if not entirely, on their formal side: their context, structure,
and articulation. As far as jokes are concerned, for instance, it is the
way you tell them that matters. With this, I am repeating what I
suggested earlier. But I am abo helping myself to move on and
focus-albeit briefly and selectively-on my understanding of
humour. The whole story, for one of my purposes, could begin with
Sigmund Freud. In his two writings on jokes, wit and witticisms,
humour, laughter and comicality, and everyday linguistic parapraxes:
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, The Psychopathology of
Everyday Lift, Freud considered these phenomena as "symptoms",
hence as vehicles of sign-functions. Therefore, he articulated a
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semiotic discourse-albeit in fluce-that identified the linguistic
and psychological mechanisms productive of comic or humorous
effects: displacement and condensation. Since Freud-and eventually
with the development of semiotics-humour and comicality have
increasingly been studied as forms of communication, in the light of
their formal aspects, as particular kinds of production of peculiar
kinds of texts or messages. The list of eloquent exponents of this
approach is too long to be mentioned here. Very selectively, we can
think of Ernst Kris and E. H. Gombrich who, in particular, applied
Freud's findings to the study of comicality in caricatures; Gillo
Oodles, who has deduced semiotic insights from his analyses of
cinematic communication; W. Fry, who identifies in humorous or
comical messages two distinctive aspects: an explicit communication
concerning a paradoxical situation, and a meta-communication that
denounces the same humorous discourse as unreal and hence subject
to the condition of paradox. Arthur Koestler has suggested that:
[t is the sunnen clash hctwcen two mutually exclusive
codes of rules-or associative contexts-that produces
the comic effect. It compels the listener 10 perceive the
situation in two self-consistent but incompat ible frames
of reference at the same time ... While this unusual
condition lasts, the event is not only, as is normally the
case, associated with a single frame of reference but
"dissociated" with two .... The word dissociation was
coined by the present writer to make a distllletion between
the routines of nisciplineci thinking within a single universe
of discourse-on a single plane, as it were-ann the
creative types of mental activity that always operate on
more than one plane. [n humour, both the creation of a
subtle joke and the recreative act of perceiving the joke
involve the delightful mental jolt of a sudden leap from
one plane or aSSOClallve context to another. I ,
Among the other authors who have taken and developed the
semiotic lead offered by Freud, we must include Victor Raskin, for his
systematic work on Semantic Mechanisms of /-Iumor; Paul Rouissac with
his '1\ Semiotic Approach to Nonsense: Clowns and Limericks"lb; and
all the contributors to the November 1976 issue of /I VctTi, in particular
Patrizia Violi's essay "Comico e Ideologia", and Giovanni Manetti's
seminal paper "Per una semiotica del comico". Manetti makes the
point very clear:
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If we shift the axis of our attention from metaphysical
concerns to language and ro sign-making or semlOsic
processes in general, comicality and humour will prove to
be a particular instance of linguistic-semiosic strategy.
They would. then, demand a spec-ifk and differentiated
elahoration of their own kind of language. A semiotic
analysIs would consist in justifying or accounting for that
specificity and difference. '7
Manetti proceeds with an outline of the basic semiotic strategies
deployed in the making of comical or humorous messages. These are
said to rest, fundamentally, on the collision and/or overlapping of
oppositional registers and codes, which-finally-explain comical
language as opposed to everyday or current language.
In his "The Comic and the Rule", Eeo reminds us that, in both
tragedy and comedy, we are dealing with the problems ofa violation of
some rule, code, or convention. '8 With this, Eco reiterates the widely
accepted idea according to which the primary mechanism for the
production of comical and humorous effects is estrangement and
defamiliarisation-hence the strategy of surprise, bordering on the
unheimlich, in Freud's sense of the "uncanny". In light of this we could
add that the 'poetic' strategies generating comicality and humour can
be said to produce-in an implicit and indirect manner-aesthetic
effects: they are akin and analogous to creative art.
Questioning the generally adopted assumption whereby tragedies
deal with the violation of universal rules (and therefore ought to
concern all humans, regardless of cuJturally and historically different
contexts), while in comedIes the violated rules are particular, Eco offers
an alternative solution to the problem. He suggests that we should focus
on another kind of question, namely: "what is our awareness of the rules
that are being violated?", in tragedy and comedy respectively. The
answer is that what distinguishes tragedy is that before, during, and after
the enacted representation of the violation of the rule, we are compelled
to linger at length precisely on the nature of the rule. On the contrary, in
the comic act, the violated rule is implicitly presupposed, taken tor
granted, and never explicitly mentioned. As Eco puts it:
'Iranslat~d into terms of textual semiotics, the hypothesis
could be formulated in this way: there exists a rhetorical
device, which concerns the fih'Urt:s of thought, in which,
given a social or Intertextua! "frame" or scenario already
known to the audience, you display the variation without.
however, making it explicit in discourse.'~
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There is, however, another question to be asked. Is there some
difference between the kind of rules violated-and reiterated or
reaffirmed-in the tragic act, and those violated-without ever
being explicitly mentioned, and actually negated or suspended-in
the comic act? Eco grants us a hint. He mentions that in tragedy we
see the violation of ethical and religious rules, while in comedy-and
comic acts-we witness and re-enact the violation of what he calls
"common scenarios":
[T]he pragmatic rules of symbolic interaction that
socIety takes for grantee!. The pie in the face makes us
laugh hecause we normally assume that, at a party. pies
are eaten and not thrown at other people. Hecause we
know that kissing a lady's hanrl means lightly grazing it
with the lips. a comic situation arises when someone
seizes the hand and covers it greerlily with wet, smacking
kisses. 2[1
Eco's refleerions on the tragic, the comical, and their relation to
the rule prompt a corollary idea. We could say that in a tragic act,
the rule-as the voice of the Other, as fate and destiny-duly
reiterated and reaffirmed, in the end wins. The violator is violated.
In Greek tragedy, where often two sets of rules-both valid and
both justitlable-"collide" (to use Hegel's chosen term to define
tragic action), the bearer of one of the two codes of moral, or
social, or religious action must be vanquished. In faer, in the end,
all the protagonists lose. Only the rule, in the guise of fate, wins.
And the unchallenged triumph of the rule is another way to define
'duty' and 'seriousness', especially in their extreme form which is
closely related to repression and neurosis. On the contrary, in the
comical act-and in humour-the violator wins and the rule is,
even if only temporarily, defeated and suspended. I say
'temporarily' vanquished, for it is there to be violated-in the
beginning-and re-emerges, re-instated, after the comical defiance.
In the end, for logical and dialectical reasons, the comical act
functions with constant reference to the rule which it presupposes.
Eco makes this point very clear. There are insightful comments on
the same idea in Hakhtin's study Loeuvre de Franro;s Rabela;s.21
Patrizia Violi suggests that:
Obviously we must not forget that the expressions of
this kind of comical-popular culture were always
mntainerl within well-rlefinerl physical-temporal spaces
8,
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such as the carnival, religious festivities, country fairs,
etc. .. Only within the hounds of exceptional times, the
freedom of the feast was allowed hy the powers to be.
And precisely their character of unique/exceptional
occurrence confirmed-in the end-the very same order
and hierarchy that-in the feast-was laughed at and
suhverted .... Even at these conditions and in these
terms, one could deploy humour for the purpose of a
really subverting and renewing purpose. However, one
would still need to acknowledge and adopt the critical
awareness of the complexity and contradictions that the
use of a language "other" necessarily implies. Its being
"other" is such only with reference to the "official
language", therefore it stands as an indirect confirmation
of the prevailing language and rule. 21
The all-pervasive presence of the rules, albeit temporarily violated
and suspended in comicality, sheds light on the conviction, held since
Aristotle, that laughter is the proprium of humans. In the first place,
humour, comicality, jokes and laughter always deal with the human
factor, and if they deal with objects or natural phenomena, they do so
in an anthropomorphic fashion and after an implicit anthropomorphic
transformation. We are reminded of this by Hergson, when he writes
in Le rire: "The first point to which attention should be called is that
the comic docs not exist outside the pale of what is strictly human".l'
At the beginning of L'umorismo, Pirandcllo quotes Rabelais, who
rightly claimed that "Ie rire est Ie propre de l'homme". Rabelais, as we
know, was not coining a brand new idea, but rather repeating an old
scholastic tapas. In Eco's words: "The 'proprium' is that characteristic
that one adds to the definition by species and genus, in order to
better single out-and in a quite unambiguous fashion-certain
members of a species. For instance, man is a vertebrate mammal
animal. Among all other such-like animals, he is also rational.
Furthermore, he is distinguished by having-as his proprium-the
trait of being ridens. No other animal-even presuming that there
may be other rational animals-knows how to laugh".14
Aristotle's statement was: "Man is the only one among living
beings, who laughs".l~ Elsewhere in the same work, he stresses the
same point by stating that "none of the animals [except humans]
laughs".l~Aristotle's observation has echoed through Rabelais and
many other voices, down to our own times. I have mentioned
Hergson. We could now quote William Hazlitt, who starts his
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Lectures on the English Comic Writers with this remark: "Man is the only
animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal struck with
the difference between what things are, and what they ought to be".27
We are the only animals capable of seeing things otherwise, never
fully isolated within solipsistic solitude, never completely bound
within the determinations of natural laws. And this is our constant
disposition, which expresses itself also in our 'proper' characteristic
that occasionally inclines us to laughter. By contrast, it is precisely
the deterministic inscription within the laws of nature-a condition
never to be altered nor overcome-that makes my little cat unable to
laugh, always a little too serious and vulnerable. Slaves to ontologically
determined 'codes', animals cannot break them, through a process of
endless semiosis and subversion in dialogical communication. By the
same token, animals are not endowed with, nor burdened by, a
psychic unconscious, and therefore they are spared the laborious task
of dealing with either super-ego, or with "symbolic apples". In our
case, the negotiated conventionality of our rules allows us to break,
change, or suspend them. This is at the very root of our laughter.
And in this may be found the full meaning of Hobbes's remark that:
The passion of laughter is nothing else Lut sudden glory
arising from some suooen conception of some eminency in
ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or
with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follIes of them-
selves past, when they come sudrlenly to rememhrance,
except they hring with them any present dishonour.!X
Breaking codes-or even the temporary illusion of breaking
them-makes us laugh. Violating rules, no matter how innocently, is
immediately 'sinful', as Eco's essay "Gener(/zione di messaggi estetici in
una lingu(/ edenim" evocatively suggests.!'} But it is also unavoidable.
Questioning, changing, subverting rules is thus most human, sinful,
and therefore also diabolical. In Baudelaire's words, "laughter is
diabolical: it is, therefore, profoundly human". He adds that
comicality is "one of the clearest diabolical traits of man, and one of
the many seeds contained within the symbolic apple". Ii)
The comical act is sinful and diabolical, because it is essentially
human. It is human to violate, suspend, break and reformulate rules.
It is fun to be suspicious towards, and enjoy a little respite from, all
that is super-ego, in whichever shape it may take, and in whichever
manner it may bind us to rules. This is what humour and comicality
are for. And so, Freud is back on the scene. Laughter and the pleasure
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afforded in comical acts, issue from a release of tension from neurotic
repression: a temporary 'taking holidays' from rules. And insofar as,
to be 'normal', we all need to be a little neurotic and a little psychotic,
by the same token-and consequently-we arc all in need oflaughter,
now and again.
Psychotics don't laugh in merriment, only derision. They have no
rules to question, suspend, or subvert. Thus they can only vanquish
and destroy everything that is 'other', 'object', and that belongs to
'the reality principle'. By contrast, humour (along with comicality
and laughter) thrives in 'otherness', and thus it also reminds us of our
finitude, while preparing us to meet the great master, the final rule:
our death, hopefully accepted, if not laughing, then with serene and
smiling disposition.
In Eco's abbey,Jorge of Burgos (forerunner of Anthony M. Ludovici)
was, in a cleverly ambiguous way. almost right. For in The Name ofthe
Rose, laughter stands for comicality, which remains dependent upon
rules, but also for humour, which questions, transforms, and re-invents
rules. Ironically, for all his animosity against laughter, Jorge in the
end laughs, while chewing the poisoned parchment that was to seal
his death. He laughs last. Hut he laughs badly. For he laughs with
destructive derisory mocking. The blind monk is terroristic. He has
done away with his unconscious instincts. He acts as a persecutory
super-ego, and as if he were God. (At this point it becomes reason-
ably clear that books such as the Bible do not have much room for
laughter and jocularity-though they could have more for merri-
ment-because they arc fundamentally conceived for the purpose of
teaching and upholding 'the rule').
While the library of The Name of the Rose goes up in flames, the
model writer and the model reader smile. Humour, rather than com-
icality, is the game. Humour consists in the conscious and explicit
critique of the rules that it presupposes. I-1umour-l'umorismo-
"must endlessly contradict and mediate itself".lI It thrives and
rejoices in ambiguity-and in the endless game of disambiguating,
while re-ambiguating. It flourishes on the threshold between rule
and violation. It criticises and teases the relative resilience and
hardness of codes, while dwelling in the fragility of our language and
of our culture:
In this way humour would not be, like the comic, vicrim
of the rule it presupposes, but would represent the
criticism of it, conscious and explicit. Humour would
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always he metasemiOlic and metatextual The comic of
language would belong to the same breed, from
Aristotelian witticisms to the puns ofJoyce. I!
We could furthermore suggest that humour also consists in sharing the
pleasure and delight of seeing things otherwise: opening up the
Pandora box of ambiguity, returning to Habel, re-inhabiting the Tower,
starting always allover again from a point of endless interrogation;
without malice, without arrogance, without envious and slandering
diabole, but with compassion, empathy, generosity of spirit, and
goodness of heart.
In the end it seems that humour functions, in some respect, like
tragedy, without, however, taking the rule too seriously: as something
that must not be questioned, that cannot and must not be revised
and reformulated anew, as some deterministically pre-ordained fate
never to be challenged and broken. Quite to the contrary, with
humour, the very opposite seems to be the case. (Alongside the
implicit and uhiquitous dialectical debate concerning tragedy and
comedy in Aristotle's writings, The Name ofthe ROJe also stands as a
sharp and elegant critique of dogmatic intolerance in the name of
rules).
There are tears in a smile. And I would like to conclude by mentioning
the film La vita ebella, as a perfect instance of this absorbing and
thought-provoking dialectical co-existence. The protagonist, played
by Renigni, humorously debunks and comically denounces the rules
tragically imposed in a concentration camp, by humorously
re-inventing a new set of playful rules that will keep his little boy
alive, engaged, even happy, in an 'other' world. As protagonist and
narrator, he invents a magical world of fun and play that rests-again
ironically and humorously again--on the same logical order of rules
imposed for repression through another game of other rules. Viewing
La vita ebella, dwelling in its fictional (and not entirely fictional)
world, we-at different times-laugh or don't laugh, we smile inside
when we often want to weep, and we weep while smiling deep inside.
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